Optimal regulatory restrictions on banks have to solve a delicate balance. Tighter regulations reduce the likelihood of banks' distress. Looser regulations foster the allocation of funds towards productive investments. With multiple banks, optimal regulation becomes even more challenging. Banks form partnerships in the interbank lending market in order to face liquidity needs and to meet investment possibilities. We show that the interbank network can suddenly collapse when regulations are pushed beyond a critical level, with a discontinuous increase in systemic risk as the cross-insurance of banks collapses.
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Introduction
Banks provide a key intermediation function in the economy. They extend loans to agents with productive investment opportunities using funds from depositors who do not have access to those opportunities. Because banks' investments can fail, depositors are only willing to provide the funds if they are ex-ante 5 compensated for potential losses, which forces bankers to internalize failure and to invest efficiently, both in terms of scale and risk exposure. The scenario changes, however, in the presence of governments that have ex-post incentives to cover the losses of depositors with distortionary taxation proceedings. These bailouts provide an implicit insurance for depositors that allows banks to obtain 10 funds at a subsidized rate and invest those funds excessively, either at a larger $ We especially thank Marvin Goodfriend, Burton Hollifield and Maryam Farboodi for excellent suggestions about how to improve the paper. We also thank Douglas Diamond, Narayana Kocherlakota, Jonathan Parker, Rakesh Vohra and the participants at the CarnegieRochester-NYU Conference in Pittsburgh for comments. The usual waiver of responsibilities applies. 
